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Abstract
Mongolia stands at yet another great crossroads in its rich and storied history. 
On the one hand it sits within the region of Northeast Asia, with the two 
global powers of China and Russia and two additional economic world leaders 
in South Korea and Japan offering opportunities and challenges over the next 
several years. On the other hand, Mongolia has aligned itself geo-politically 
with the United States, sending troops to Iraq and striving to develop a 
burgeoning democracy that will both improve conditions at home and impress 
the United States. This article will explore the current relations Mongolia has 
with its Northeast Asian neighbors and the United States, paying particular 
attention to the balance it strives to maintain in these early years of the twenty-
fi rst century.
Keywords: geopolitics, Northeast Asia, Mongolia-China relations, Mongolia-Japan 
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Mongolia and China
On the whole, relations between China and Mongolia are understood by both sides to 
be mutually beneficial. Historic distrust of China still exists in the thinking of most 
Mongolians, and it can be expressed in powerful and personal ways. When I made my 
first trip to Mongolia ten years ago with my wife, who is Chinese, we were told that 
it was best not to tell people we met that she was, in fact, Chinese. As we lived at that 
time in Hawaii, she was advised to say she was from Hawaii, not China. That seemed to 
work, and she was warmly accepted everywhere she went as Hawaiian. 
Despite the long standing distrust of China, however, Mongolians today see 
the overwhelming need to deal with China as a partner rather than an enemy. There is 
no question that economic development and political balance now guide Mongolia’s 
relationship with China. Since its separation from Soviet infl uence and establishment of 
a democratic political structure in Mongolia in the early 1900s, a new era of cooperation 
has begun. In 1989, Mongolia’s trade with China stood at US$24.1 million. By 2003, it 
had reached over $483 million and continued rising. This now makes China the largest 
trading partner with Mongolia. That same year almost half of Mongolia’s exports were 
sent to China. There is no doubt that Mongolia, similar to other countries in the Asian 
region, is highly dependent on China’s economy to help stimulate its own growth 
(Rossabi 2005: 2). 
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In addition to an increase in trade and investment, Chinese aid to Mongolia has 
been important to the development of Mongolia’s economy. Between 1991 and 1997, 
China gave Mongolia 42.6 million yuan, and in 1998 aid from China was in the amount 
of 30 million yuan. This amount dropped dramatically in 2000 and 2001, but resumed 
for 2002 and 2003 to around 30 million yuan per year. Interestingly, much of this direct 
aid paid for living quarters for the Mongolian military, perhaps an enjoyable dig at the 
former Russian big brother who had bankrolled much of the Mongolian armed forces 
prior to the 1990s. China also came to the support of Mongolia in a relief action during 
this period, when Mongolia experienced harsh winters that killed off up to one third of 
its livestock, and Chinese aid helped Mongolia to get through this catastrophe (Rossabi 
2005: 3; Campi 2004: 14).
These economic ties have brought with it the exchange of students, scholars 
and scientists between China and Mongolia. Toward this end China has established 
an impressive number of fellowships for Mongolian students to study in Chinese 
universities (Campi 2005: 8). It was early in the establishment of the new era that 
Mongolians began to see the importance of sending their children to China for higher 
education and professional training. In 2000, I discussed the educational track of 
Mongolian students abroad with a professor at a Ulaanbaatar university, who told me 
that his daughter was in Beijing getting her university degree in education. I asked 
why Beijing, and he said quite candidly that Mongolia could no longer ignore China’s 
presence and power, and Mongolians now had to establish professional and personal 
relations with the Chinese, and to learn the language. He acknowledged that he was 
ambivalent about sending his daughter to China due to his national pride, but now that 
she was there, he was impressed with the education she received, and with the good will 
she could garner for Mongolia’s benefi t in the future.
In addition to the educational opportunities, tens of thousands of Mongolians 
travel to China each year for medical treatment. The 1999 Medical Treatment Agreement 
signed between the two countries contributes to this, but even without the agreement, 
it is understood that Mongolians will enter China, many going to Inner Mongolia, for 
treatment of serious illnesses. For citizens of a country not allowed to travel to China as 
recently as 1990, due to strict visa regulations and tense political relations, the change is 
dramatic. Now a visa is not even required to enter China for a short visit (Campi 2004: 
14-15).
As we can see, in the area of economics and cultural exchange, China holds 
the power, and appears to be using it in a fashion that diminishes, if only slightly, the 
anxiety Mongolia feels toward China’s presence in Mongolia. Many Mongolians still 
fear that China has designs on their vast land, with some arguing that China hopes 
to annex Mongolia, or at least to control it through its economic might and military 
threat. They ask if China will continue to invest in Mongolia at the level it has in the 
past decade, or will it uproot and take its business elsewhere, to cheaper labor. We have 
seen this happened globally with industries, especially in developing countries, as rich 
international corporations move from one cheap labor market to another on short notice. 
Mongolians have reason to be fearful of these possibilities, but it appears that for the 
foreseeable future these fears will not be realized. This is due to the role Mongolia 
plays, and will continue to play, in China’s foreign policy. 
China’s interest in Mongolia is based in large measure on its relationship with 
Russia and the United States. After years of distrust and disrespect shown between 
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the governments of China and Mongolia due to historical events and Mongolia’s 
dependence on the Soviet Union for most of the twentieth century, political relations 
have improved dramatically. Batchimeg (2005: 4) states that after the Sino-Soviet 
confl ict eased in the late twentieth century, Mongolia was allowed to choose its partners 
more freely:
After this main obstacle disappeared, Beijing and Ulaanbaatar each recognized 
their shared strategic interest, and consequently decided to reengage one 
another. While Russia, the former ally, still enjoys certain political and 
economic influence in Mongolia, it is now the PRC which emerges as the 
main political and economic partner of Mongolia. 
He goes on to argue that “Beijing’s strategy is to create a peaceful external environment 
for its development, to strengthen its relationship with neighboring countries, and to 
build a positive international image as a responsible power adhering to international 
norms. This approach has thus far succeeded in creating an environment of trust on 
which to further develop the current Mongolia-China rapprochement” (Batchimeg 
2005: 4). This optimistic view is supported by the 1991 visit to Mongolia of President 
Yang Shangkun, when he expressed respect for the “independence and sovereignty of 
Mongolia,” and the 1994 visit of Premier Li Peng, when he signed a treaty promoting 
friendship and cooperation, including the support for Mongolia to develop relations with 
other countries (Campi 2004: 10-13). In 2003 Hu Jingtao visited Ulaanbaatar, showing 
China’s continued interest in Mongolia. 
Despite the optimism, however, Batchimeg (2005: 4) understands that this 
relationship, at least from China’s side, is based on Mongolia’s importance due to its 
“crucial geopolitical interest” (quoting Li 2002: 30). China and Mongolia share the 
longest border held by China with any other country, and matters of security and stability 
in the minority regions of north China bordering Mongolia, especially Inner Mongolia, 
are paramount to the continued success of its economic growth and political infl uence 
abroad. Recognizing this, Mongolia has agreed to support China’s efforts in maintaining 
harmony in its northern minority regions. Witness the visit to Inner Mongolia by 
President Bagabande who stated that he was “impressed with China’s efforts to protect 
the culture and education of the Mongolia minority” in China (Rossabi 2005: 3; 
Batchimeg 2005: 4). This view is interpreted by many as a gesture of accommodation to 
China’s growing role in Mongolia’s economic and political landscape, and not refl ective 
of deep-seated historical distrust of China’s perceived destruction of Mongolian values 
and practices over the years. 
One fi nal indication of China’s interest in staying close to Mongolia’s political 
development is its engagement with the major political parties of Mongolia, including 
the Mongolian Revolutionary Party and the new democratic parties that have sprung up 
over the past nineteen years. This shows the interest China has in aligning with those in 
power and maintaining good relations with potential leaders. With this approach, China 
is assured allies when Mongolian political winds shift (Batchimeg 2005: 4-5). It also 
gives China an ear to the ground on Mongolia’s democratic politics and what impact 
this may have on Inner Mongolian intentions (Campi 2005: 6). In 1990, for example, the 
Mongolian Democratic Party advocated “Uniting the Three Mongolias” of Mongolia, 
Inner Mongolia, and Mongolian Buryatskaya with a common spoken and written 
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language and a national identity that linked them closely together (Wang 2005: 10). This 
does not sit well in Beijing, and the better their intelligence is on Mongolia’s political 
scene, the quicker the Chinese can respond to perceived threats of instability in Inner 
Mongolia.
To sum up the relations between China and Mongolia, China is in the driver’s 
seat due to its economic and political might, and the influence this has on the long 
border shared by the two. From China’s side, which has used every aspect of soft 
power available to it, the situation is excellent. Jiang Zeming stated that there are now 
no unsettled political, legal or historical problems existing between the two countries. 
That is easy for him to say, as his country holds the major cards in the relationship. 
From Mongolia’s side, the deep-seated distrust of China is still strong in the Mongolian 
consciousness. Mongolia is right to believe that China is out to protect China’s interest 
first, and to help Mongolia second. But, despite this, there is no indication that there 
exist fundamental issues that should bring serious tension or conflict in the future. 
Mongolia, as it has done for centuries, is fi nding the right path for itself in this new era 
of a powerful China.
Mongolia and Russia
On my fi rst visit to Mongolia in 2000 I was struck by two realities. First, as a student 
of modern China, I had not realized that animosity toward China was so deeply rooted. 
Second, I was surprised to find the depth of affinity and appreciation the Mongolian 
people felt toward the people of the former Soviet Union. I had visited Romania during 
the Soviet days, and noticed from Romanian people an abiding, almost personal, disdain 
for the Russians. I expected to fi nd that in Mongolia too. However, despite the Soviet 
influence having overriding control of political and military affairs, the educational, 
medical and economic improvements brought to the Mongolian people during the Soviet 
era seemed to be genuinely appreciated. The Soviet advisors who came to Mongolia 
were in the main accepted and, in fact, personally liked. The education received by 
today’s leaders and scholars in Soviet universities is universally praised to this day, and 
for many was a more meaningful experience educationally than that found in Western 
classrooms over the past two decades. 
When I asked a Mongolian colleague why China was so despised but the Soviet 
Union, basically an occupying power, was appreciated, his answer was both startling 
and illuminating. He said that the Soviet Union, unlike China, “never tried to change 
our culture”. When asked about the mass executions and purges of 1937, he stated 
that it was Mongolians killing and oppressing Mongolians, not Soviet troops killing 
Mongolians. “We did that to ourselves,” he said. In case this statement is assumed to be 
the opinion of someone detached from that era, he informed me that his own grandfather 
had been shot during the purges of that time.
As recently as 2005, Mongolian Foreign Minister Tsend Munh-Orgil stated (Azizian 2005): 
Mongolians gratefully acknowledge Russia’s important role in 
obtaining national independence from Manchuria and securing breakthrough 
achievements in the social and economic development. Although never a 
communist state by ideology, Mongolia was forced to join the socialist camp 
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as a satellite Soviet state to ensure its national sovereignty and independent 
existence. The years of cooperation with the then Soviet Union and other 
socialist states helped Mongolia leap forward towards general literacy, quality 
public health and education, and succeed in turning a backward nation of half 
a million nomadic cattle-breeders into a modern social welfare state of 2.5 
million in less than 70 years.
This being said, Mongolia is in the midst of making a dramatic turn from dependence 
and alliances with its longtime supporter and friend, Russia, to its more feared and 
distrusted southern neighbor. What do we fi nd now? On the economic front we fi nd that 
Mongolia exports over 47 percent of its goods to China, while the Russian Federation 
receives about 16 percent (Dugerjav 2005). This stands in stark contrast to the pre-
1990s when Mongolia’s economy relied on massive Soviet loans, aid and its limited 
exports. During those years over 720 Soviet projects were built to improve power and 
transportation infrastructure and mining output. By the mid-1990s these improved 
structures were falling into disrepair and disuse. One report states that Russia’s share in 
Mongolia’s trade has fallen from 72 percent to 20 percent since the early 1990s (Azizian 
2005). Campi argues that during the Sino-Soviet confl ict of the late 1970s, Mongolia 
used its “China card” to convince the Soviet Union to pump greater economic assistance 
into the country in exchange for greater Soviet military presence on the Chinese-
Mongolian border (Campi 2004: 9-10). Perhaps during this new era Mongolia once 
again plays the “China card” to entice Russia to invest more so that China will not be so 
dominant.
In recent years, Russia has made strides to increase its economic and political 
activity with Mongolia, seemingly in direct relation to Mongolia’s growing dependence 
on China. In 2000, President Vladimir Putin visited Mongolia on one of his fi rst trips 
abroad as President. In 2002, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov visited Mongolia, 
followed by Mongolian Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar’s offi cial visit to Russia 
in 2003. Putin and Enkhbayar met again in 2005.
These visits, and accompanying business deals growing out of the visits, have 
created a slow resurgence of Russian presence in Mongolia. There was, for example, a 
15.5 percent increase in trade in 2004, and Russian private investment increased in 2005 
to around $USD50 million. Two hundred and sixty-fi ve joint projects in Mongolia, many 
related to railway development, are ongoing, with plans to develop more. Despite these 
promising developments, however, the reality may be less than meets the eye. Most of 
the trade, around 70 percent, is located in the Siberian border regions and does not move 
south easily. Promising agreements signed to build oil pipelines falter, as Russia moves 
to more lucrative partners such as Japan (Blagov 2005: 8-9; Azizian 2005).
Russia may not find Mongolia to be a profitable economic ally, but it looks 
askance at China’s move into Mongolia and can do little about it. It views Mongolia’s 
growing relationship and dependence on the US with concern and, like China, is always 
weary of Pan-Mongolian nationalism raising its head in the minority regions of Russia. 
In the end, it is probable that the historical alliance between the two will allow trade and 
political alliances to continue, but at a fl at, rather than dynamic rate. Areas of mutual 
interest that will be explored in the future include energy supplies from Russia to China, 
transportation links, military and law enforcement cooperation and a continuation of 
educational opportunities for students going both ways (Azizian 2005).
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On Mongolia’s side, it no longer sees the need to focus on Russia for its export 
of natural resources, but shops around for the highest bidder. Japan and Canada are 
active, but none compare with the interest shown by China. Despite this, Mongolia 
makes it a point to show Russia that it will not tilt away from that historical friendship 
to advantage China. A Mongolian Foreign Ministry statement reads (Azizian 2005): 
Maintaining friendly relations with the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China shall be a priority direction of Mongolia’s foreign policy 
activity. It shall not adopt the line of either country but shall maintain in 
principle a balanced relationship with both of them and shall promote all-
round neighborly cooperation. In doing so, the traditional relations as well as 
the specifi c nature of our economic cooperation with these two countries will 
be taken into account.
Mongolia and Japan
Relations with Japan are good. Japan opened its embassy in Ulaanbaatar in 1972. 
Following this, Japan and Mongolia initiated a series of “firsts” between this former 
Soviet ally and modern industrial, democratic countries. These include the 1989 visit 
of the Japanese foreign minister to Ulaanbaatar, the 1990 visit to Japan of Prime 
Minister Sodnem, the 1991 visit to Mongolia by Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu and 
1992 and 1993 visits to Japan by the Mongolian Prime Minister. These visits have 
continued through the years, with Prime Minister Enkhbold’s March 2006 visit to Japan 
highlighting the continued close relationship between the two countries. During this visit 
he met with the Emperor and Empress of Japan, as well as holding a summit meeting 
with then Prime Minister Koizumi.
Mongolia-Japan relations are mutually beneficial, though not in the same 
categories. As stated by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, “based on Japan’s belief that 
the success of democratization and the transformation to a free-market economy in 
Mongolia would contribute to peace and stability in the East Asian region, from the 
outset it has given active assistance to newly democratized Mongolia, and since 1991 
has continued to be the largest donor of aid” (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
[MoFA] 2006). During the 1990s, Japan, in cooperation with the World Bank, held seven 
conferences with multiple international partners to discuss ways to assist Mongolia 
during its early years of democratic and market economy transition. Six of those were 
held in Tokyo (MoFA 2006).
Contributions to Japan from Mongolia come in the way of international support 
for Japan’s role in the United Nations and in international negotiations. Mongolia’s role 
in establishing itself as a nuclear free zone, and working toward peaceful resolution to 
the tensions found in Northeast Asia, are in line with Japan’s interests. Mongolia is a 
strong supporter of Japan’s goal to become a member of the United Nations Security 
Council, and recently backed Japan’s position on its right to harvest whales from the 
world’s oceans. This seemingly insignificant action speaks volumes for Mongolia’s 
interest in maintaining good relations with Japan, as it is diffi cult to see what strategic 
interest landlocked Mongolia has in the whaling industry.
The importance of Mongolia’s relationship with Japan is summed up by comments 
made in Japan by Mongolian Foreign Minister Tsend Munh-Orgil in March 2005. Speaking 
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at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, he stated (Munh-Orgil 2005): 
Relations with Japan occupy a special and in many ways strategic place 
in Mongolia’s foreign policy thinking. Japan’s assistance to Mongolia’s 
transformation to a democracy and market economy remain a crucial factor as 
Japan alone accounts for close to 70 per cent of ODA [offi cial development 
assistance] received by Mongolia since 1991. We also recognize that this 
grateful acknowledgment of Japan’s help places a special duty on us, 
Mongolians, to make a good use of the generous assistance of the people 
of Japan and deliver better living for our people faster. Mongolia supports 
Japan’s aspirations to occupy a more significant role in regional and global 
affairs, and in particular its aspirations to become a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council.
While relations between Mongolia and Japan continue to be positive, this does not mean 
that there are not small differences. From a robust, relatively unchecked contribution to 
Mongolia’s economy and infrastructure during the 1990s, we now fi nd a reluctance on 
the part of many in Japan to continue sending substantial funds to Mongolia. This is true 
not only in government economic assistance, but from private foundations and granting 
agencies. From a high of over $USD100 million in 2000, we find that in 2004 the 
combined contributions dropped to just over $60 million (Sato 2005). In part this is due 
to Japan’s decision that it could not continue to assist any country at such a high level 
indefi nitely, but it is also indicative of the concern of Japanese government offi cials and 
granting agencies that the money has not been well spent, and that corruption has taken 
an enormous bite out of the potentially good intentions of the aid. Another factor was the 
failure of Mongolia to take care of outstanding loans to Russia, which was a weight on 
the country’s development. Most of that debt has now been forgiven, and this, coupled 
with Prime Minister Enkhbold’s successful visit to Japan in 2005, has allowed the 
Japanese government, for the fi rst time in fi ve years, to extend a new loan to Mongolia 
to assist in the development of small enterprises and protection of the environment.
Relations between Japan and Mongolia show no signs of diminishing. Each 
should continue to find mutual agreement on most fronts, with economic support 
provided by Japan to Mongolia and geo-political support offered by Mongolia to Japan.
Mongolia and Korea
Relations between both Koreas and Mongolia are stable, and potentially important for 
Northeast Asian security. In the field of economics, exports from Mongolia to South 
Korea are relatively small compared to China, the US, Russia and Japan. South Korea, 
however, is the fourth largest importer of goods from Mongolia, with 6.0 percent of the 
market, just slightly less than that of Japan. According to an article in an Institute for 
Strategic Studies publication, Korea ranks as the second largest investor in Mongolia, 
a fact appreciated by many Mongolians. As one Mongolian scholar states, “To begin 
with, we, on the Mongolian side must profoundly acknowledge and deeply cherish the 
Korean factor in the post-Communist development of the Mongolian polity, society and 
economy” (Khirghis 2004: 136).
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Economic interaction does not stop with offi cial trade of goods, however. The 
use of Mongolian contract labor in South Korea is a recent and growing development. 
I learned this fi rsthand several years ago when I traveled from Korea to Mongolia on 
Mongolian Airlines, sitting next to a representative of the Mongolian Ministry of Labor. 
This offi cial had just been in Seoul negotiating future contracts for Mongolian workers 
in Korea’s construction industry. By 2005 there were over 20,000 Mongolians living 
and working in Korea, both as contract workers and as immigrant laborers. Likewise, a 
few thousand Koreans now live in Mongolia, setting up businesses and investing in the 
country (Syungje 2005). It is obvious that Mongolia also attracts Korean tourists to its 
niche eco-tourism industry, an opportunity Mongolia should consider exploiting more 
with a renewed commitment to tourist infrastructure, such as hotel, air, train and bus 
expansion.
But it is not in the realm of economics that Mongolia plays its most important 
role in relation to the two Koreas. It is in the arena of Northeast Asian security and 
harmony that the greatest impact is, and will be, felt. It is clear that Mongolia’s relations 
with North Korea may be the most relaxed of any country in the world. In part this is a 
historical consequence of the Korean War when Mongolians welcomed North Korean 
orphans and other children to their country to escape the ravages of war. These children 
were educated in Mongolia, developed close relations with Mongolian families, and 
upon their return to North Korea as late as the 1960s, never forgot the kindness of 
Mongolians (Syungje 2005). There is a history of student exchange between the two 
countries that developed over the period during the Cold War, establishing personal 
relations that still continue. This history has allowed the two countries to maintain close 
relations through to the present day. To balance the exporting of Mongolian labor to 
South Korea, there are now North Korean laborers working in Mongolia. Periodic trade 
shows from North Korea are held in Ulaanbaatar, scholars exchange visits and opinions, 
and government offi cials are more active now than just a few years ago with the recent 
re-opening of the North Korean embassy in Ulaanbaatar. 
Mongolia uses its relationship with North Korea in one of the most impressive 
examples of soft power diplomacy to be found in the world. Mongolia is now a 
democratic nation which has moved swiftly and decisively away from a totalitarian style 
of government. But it does not preach to North Korea about the values of democracy 
or the terrors of a totalitarian state. Much to the displeasure of the new friends in the 
United States, it leaves that to others. Mongolia plays a different role. 
I once held a discussion with a Mongolian government official who travels 
between Mongolia and North Korea, in which the Mongolian style of persuasion 
was explained to me. “In Mongolia,” he said, “we have multiple television stations 
from all over the world, with programs from the US, Europe, China and, of course, 
Mongolia. We have freedom of choosing our work and we can move around the world 
to see different countries. We vote for our leaders. New restaurants open regularly, and 
entertainment opportunities abound. We want North Koreans to experience these things, 
and we think by their own experiences in Mongolia we can slowly convince many that 
there is a better way than what they have now. As old friends, this is how we hope to 
persuade them to change”.
South Korea sees this as a positive and helpful position on the part of Mongolia, 
and encourages the continuation of this soft diplomacy. Khirghis (2004: 137) argues 
that because Mongolians have lived under both Communist Party rule and democratic 
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rule, they have a unique role to play in explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each 
to parties in the North and South, who have no meaningful experience in the political, 
economic and cultural life of the other:
Perhaps this factor can be an additional bonus in the role of the ordinary 
Mongolian people involved in business, academic, etc. (i.e. the public 
diplomacy), that would help to ease the cultural barriers between the Korean 
compatriots prior, during and following the hopeful unifi cation. 
Mongolians can show the North Koreans that a transition to some form of economic 
reform and democracy does not have to end in the arrest and executions of the current 
power elite, such as happened in Romania. It can be relatively peaceful (Khirghis 2004: 
137). Results from this type of diplomacy may take a long while, but it is obvious that 
the hard line approach may take even longer, and is fraught with potentially horrific 
consequences. And Mongolia continues along this helpful path despite the sour looks 
from US offi cials.
Mongolia and the United States
The visit by President George Bush to Mongolia in November 2005 signifi es a milestone 
in U.S.–Mongolia relations, but more importantly provides a signal to the world that 
Mongolia has placed itself strategically as an ally to the most powerful Western nation 
in the world. This is a signifi cant, some might say remarkable, turn of events over just 
the past several years. Khirghis (2004: 82-83) states: 
In the contemporary history of world affairs, certain patterns of relations 
between the two sovereign states represent a range of correlations – from the 
thoroughly even relations between the two equal powers to the protector-
satellite type between the two unequal players. Being a relatively weak 
player on the international scene, Mongolia throughout the 20th century has 
experienced the latter type of bilateralism, depending on its more powerful 
neighbor –Russia/Soviet Union. However, since the 1990s the relations 
between Mongolia and the United States represent a puzzling phenomenon – 
being neither type of the two above-mentioned relations.
To begin with, the United States offered Mongolia an official diplomatic 
recognition only in 1987…, yet the bilateral ties intensified more rapidly 
than between any other two states with the same short period of mutual 
recognition. Moreover, there is a huge gap in terms of population, overall 
economic performance, political weight, culture and other factors; still, the 
relations have developed steadily. In addition, both sides do not consider the 
other as a priority in its foreign policy…Nevertheless, the state and effect of 
bilateral relations…retain an intensive pattern. A special part of these relations 
is the military cooperation, but it is still not an alliance-type partnership, as 
some sources are quick to describe it.
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Khirghis is correct to point out military cooperation as one of the keys to this 
fast developing relationship. The equally important link for the US is Mongolia’s 
commitment to free elections, its repudiation of communist principles and the opening 
of its markets. In President Bush’s comments to members of the Great Hural in 2005, a 
large portion of his talk focused on the military support given to the Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and, in his mind, the direct tie to new democratic principles (Bush, 
2005b): 
Mongolia has made the transition from communism to freedom, and in just 
15 years you’ve become a vibrant democracy and opened up your economy. 
You’re an example of success for this region of the world…This conviction 
has inspired the Mongolian people to share the hope of freedom with others 
who have not known it…Your forces are serving alongside  US and coalition 
forces helping to train the Armed Forces of a free Afghanistan. And in 
September, Mongolia sent its fifth rotation of forces to Iraq and Mongolian 
soldiers are serving in that country with courage and great distinction…In 
Iraq, Mongolian forces have helped make possible a stunning transformation. 
Getting to the core of his remarks, Bush (2005b) made crystal clear his view of world 
events, making comparisons some Mongolians might fi nd off the mark. He stated:
Like the ideology of communism, the ideology of Islamic radicalism is led 
by a self-appointed vanguard that presumes to speak for the masses. Like 
the ideology of communism, Islamic radicalism…[claims] that men and 
women who live in liberty are weak and decadent. And like the ideology of 
communism, the ideology of Islamic radicalism is destined to fail…As you 
help others secure the blessings of liberty, you continue the work of building a 
free society at home, and as you travel this path, the United States walks with 
you.
Bush ended his talk in Ulaanbaatar with the words most Mongolian officials were 
waiting to hear. How would this support of the  US invasion of Iraq prove benefi cial in 
concrete ways for the Mongolian government and people? He did not disappoint. He 
stated that the United States would provide funds from the new Solidarity Initiative “to 
nations like Mongolia standing with America in the war on terror. Mongolia will receive 
$11 million under this new initiative with funds to help you improve your military 
forces, so we can continue working together for the cause of peace and freedom.” He 
then continued with a comments related to the eagerly anticipated Millennium Challenge 
Account. “In recognition of your progress,” he stated, “Mongolia is in line to receive 
funds from this account ‘as soon as possible’” (Bush 2005b).
These comments by President Bush state clearly the U.S view of the relationship 
between these two very different countries. Stay on the path of democracy, a free market 
and visible support of the war on terror as defi ned by the United States, and the United 
States will provide substantial support for the continued development of the economy 
and military. Stray from this support, and the consequences, while unstated, are 
understood as a cold shoulder to a weak ally. 
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The predicament this places upon the Mongolian government is significant. 
While official pronouncements declare the importance of democracy and anti-terror 
motives, Mongolians do not show strong support for the war in Iraq, and there are calls 
to bring their troops home. I have spoken informally to several Mongolian offi cials about 
their view of Iraq, and the defense is never couched in terms of protection of democracy 
or anti-terror activity. It is, rather, a practical response to a practical need. The lingering 
and frustrating negotiations between US and Mongolian officials on the Millennium 
Challenge Account is a better gauge of the true sentiments of Mongolians. Such a 
view was expressed to me in 2005 at an informal gathering, just after the government 
announced yet another dispatchment of troops to Iraq. A high level government offi cial 
expressed irritation with the delay in getting the Millennium funds to Mongolia. “What 
do they want from us?” he asked, “we have just agreed to send more troops to Iraq, and 
still they won’t provide what was promised”. The connection between support of the 
US-led invasion of Iraq and expected fi nancial rewards could not have been more clear.
Despite the close and dependent nature of the relationship from both countries, 
Mongolia has shown impressive independence from the US in strategic areas. The 
development of the “third neighbor” concept is both creative and on the mark in this era 
of multiple Asian powers. While using the term generally to describe Japan and Western 
countries with interests in Northeast Asia, this phrase clearly represents Mongolia’s 
view of the US as a new and strategic neighbor. The lack of a geographic border is of 
little importance anymore, as Mongolia recognizes that the US is just next door in every 
other way, be it militarily, economically or strategically. If there was any doubt who the 
real “third neighbor” is, President Bush clarifi ed it in an interview with Eagle Television 
just before his visit to Mongolia when he said, “We kind of consider ourselves – we like 
the slogan, ‘the third neighbor’” (Bush 2005a).
The concept of a third neighbor has intriguing strategic implications. It sends the 
message to all, including the US, that Russia and China are still neighbors number one 
and two. It tells the US that despite the new close relationship, nothing can come before 
the relations with these two powerful and historic neighbors. It also sends the message 
that it is not a puppet of the Americans. This is most clearly seen in the disagreement 
over North Korea. The US has made it clear to Mongolia that its relationship with North 
Korea is too relaxed, and not judgmental enough on the part of Mongolia. But Mongolia 
has not altered its approach, and this admonishment falls on suspicious, perhaps deaf, 
ears. Mongolia engages North Korea, desires North Korea to change toward a more free 
society, and does what it can in soft diplomacy to show North Korea the advantages of 
change. In this way it is closer to the Chinese and Russian positions than that of the US.
The third neighbor concept plays another role in Mongolian independence in 
that it sends the message to the fi rst two neighbors that there is a new powerful player 
Mongolia can depend on, and China and Russia must factor that in when viewing 
relations with Mongolia. Russia’s infl uence has diminished, though not evaporated, and 
China’s has increased dramatically. Both oppose the US-led action in Iraq, but Mongolia 
goes its own path there regardless. Each views with concern the new and growing US 
influence in Mongolia. Wang Wei-fang argues, “The Chinese government… regards 
the US as a ‘potential foe’ which is threatening to deploy an encirclement strategy 
connecting from Central Asia on up to Mongolia. In future this will make China feel 
more restricted and less secure. Therefore, from now on, Beijing cannot afford to 
overlook the importance of developing relations with Mongolia to counter the US 
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encirclement strategy” (Wang 2005: 12). Mongolia is well aware of this, and walks a 
fi ne line between China and the US as it protects its own self-interests. It is an old tactic, 
and a tried and true one. 
The future of Mongolian-US relations will continue to improve if both sides 
fi nd they have something to gain from the relationship. For Mongolia, the future must 
be driven by strategic and economic relations, but in the long term it has placed major 
importance in the field of education. Mongolia now patterns much of its educational 
innovations on US concepts, acknowledges English as the most important foreign 
language to study (surpassing English usage in the countries of Japan and Korea) and 
welcomes American Peace Corp volunteers in the classroom. Babaar states that it is 
through culture as much as through diplomacy and strategic relations that countries 
change. He represents many in Mongolia when he says, “Mongolians want to prove 
that real seeds of freedom are planted not through technology, but through culture…
[and] these cultural relations [should be] the main foundation. Mongolians need culture 
through American-style knowledge and education. If thousands of Mongolian young 
people go to America, study there and return home with knowledge, then the foundation 
of an exemplifying castle of freedom and democracy in the Asian continent will be 
built” (Babaar 2005).
Finally, the US, which dominates the relationship fi nancially and militarily, must 
follow up on its commitments to Mongolia by showing more respect for the integrity of 
the government and the contributions it has made to US interests internationally. One 
way to show this is to upgrade Mongolia’s diplomatic profi le, which is currently handled 
by a junior level offi cer attached to the China desk. It is time for the State Department 
to open a fully-fl edged Mongolia desk. Another is to come to a swift resolution on the 
lingering Millennium Challenge Account and support Mongolia’s infrastructure needs, 
especially in education. Third would be to increase US trade with Mongolia, and to push 
for Mongolia to be included in regional and international trade associations so it can 
expand its own economy (Noerper 2005).
Conclusion
The balancing act Mongolia must perform to maintain its political cultural autonomy is 
challenged from both its northern and southern neighbors. A historic distrust of China, 
coupled with a modern dependency on Chinese investment and trade, forces Mongolia 
to check its historic concerns about China’s intentions, and forge a new relationship 
based on mutual interests. A historically friendly relationship with Russia is challenged 
by the diminishing importance of economic trade and investment from Russia into 
Mongolia, especially in comparison to the growing Chinese presence.
Relations with Korea and Japan are more distant, but continue to move in a 
healthy and productive direction. Japan has provided large sums of aid to Mongolia 
through the government of Japan and non-profi t foundations, though there is a troubling 
downturn in Japanese support for Mongolia in the past few years. The fact that Japan 
is a close ally of the United States assures that Japan and Mongolia will cooperate on 
geo-political issues for some time to come. The Korean peninsula offers an intriguing 
set of challenges to Mongolia. As a burgeoning democracy with a free market economy 
Mongolia and South Korea have no real contradictions ideologically. At the same time, 
due to historic ties, Mongolia and North Korea are on friendly terms. This coziness with 
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North Korea does not sit well with the United States, but shows Mongolia’s balanced 
and proud response to political pressure from a new friend and powerful supporter.
The United States does not have a physical border with Mongolia, but in today’s 
globalized world that is not so important. Mongolia has chosen to align itself with the 
United States, but knows that on a day-to-day basis the relationship with its Northeast 
Asian neighbors is of equal, if not more, importance in the building of a secure and 
dynamic society. The balancing act between traditional hostilities and new economic 
realities, between a traditional nomadic culture and the demands of a free market 
economy, and the balancing act of maintaining positive relations with old, yet weak 
friends, such as North Korea, and new, immensely powerful friends, such as the United 
States, will continue to play itself out for a very long time.
Mongolia has made great progress in the past twenty-one years. Through brilliant 
international diplomacy that offends almost no one, Mongolia has secured a special 
place in international affairs as it walks a fine and creative line between competing 
competitive powers. Old friends from the Soviet days are still friends, and new friends 
from the western democracies are equally good friends. It has developed new and still 
experimental democratic structures and free market economics that are watched by other 
developing nations around the world, especially, one hopes, North Korea. While fi ghting 
poverty and corruption, not unlike many other former socialist countries, it stands out as 
a success story to the world.
The future, however, is still not clear, and it is important for Mongolia to parley 
this new found respect into a greater role in Northeast Asia. It is, in large measure, 
respect that Mongolia strives to attain as a recognized player in the region despite the 
size of its population and the weakness of its economy. The challenges were stated well 
by Foreign Minister Munh-Orgil in March, 2005 before an audience in Japan when he 
said (Munh-Orgil 2005): 
Mongolia is not afraid of the regional integration because it has a strong 
national identity, a proud history and a unique culture. Mongolia’s regional 
identity is far less certain and the search for it shall be an important foreign 
policy and developmental goal for the country. Mongolia is not and cannot 
be satisfi ed with its present limited participation in the regional multilateral 
dialogue. Not involved in the Six Party Talks, not a party to APEC or ASEM 
or the on-going talks on the modalities for the future East Asian Community, 
Mongolia will continue its efforts for greater regional cooperation.
Mongolia should not be in this position. Its diplomatic skills, strategic and geographic 
importance, political direction and global connections are proven. It is the responsibility 
of Mongolia’s friends and partners from Russia, Korea, Japan, the United States 
and now China to acknowledge the important contributions Mongolia has taken in 
international affairs in such a short time and to step up and support Mongolia in its goal 
to be a full and respected player in regional and global affairs.
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